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THE RIGHT TO THE WORLD’S LONGEST RIVER:
REOPENING THE VEXING CASE OF THE NILE RIVER
AMIN R. YACOUB* & BECKY BRIGGS**

Whiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over.1
–Mark Twain
ABSTRACT
Disputes over rivers and water resources extend back to early
civilizations. Yet, the current dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia may
rank among the most vexing water disputes in modern history. The
Grand Ethiopian Dam filling is close to completion, and, if no cooperative
or legal solution is reached, many adverse consequences will start appearing gradually on the Egyptian share of the Nile River, which may
ultimately pose a threat to the African peace. Currently, the international
community is standing in vain after multiple unsuccessful attempts at
negotiation and mediation. While legal and political scholars have discussed mechanisms and substantive standards applicable to water disputes, no scholarship currently exists regarding the application of those
mechanisms and standards specifical to the Nile River dispute. Accordingly, this Article scrutinizes the current legal, political, and quasi-legal
mechanisms and substantive standards governing water disputes to
determine the most suitable mechanism of dispute resolution to adopt in
the Nile River dispute. Further, it assesses the landmark U.S. Supreme
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Court decisions in interstate water disputes to identify the most adequate
substantive standard that may likely resolve the Nile River dispute.
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INTRODUCTION
Geographically, the Nile River is regarded as the world’s longest
river.2 The river flows from the south of eastern Africa (Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya), passes through ten African nations (including Ethiopia),
and empties, to the north, into the Mediterranean Sea, located in Egypt.3
Historically, the Nile River is where the Ancient Egyptian civilization first
began thousands of years ago.4 Disputes over rivers and water resources
extend back to early civilizations on both international and domestic levels.5
The river dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia originated after Ethiopia
decided—without regard to the vital needs of neighboring countries—to
build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.6 Ethiopia asserted that establishing this Dam is necessary to fulfill its needs for hydropower and
irrigated agriculture, which are both required to promote development.7
The Dam filling is close to completion, and the adverse consequences will
start appearing gradually on every African nation between Ethiopia and
Egypt, leaving Egypt particularly susceptible to a critical water shortage.8
Generally, current literature discusses both the mechanisms available to resolve international river disputes and substantive principles applicable to these disputes.9 Regarding the former, scholars have scrutinized
the role of commissions and cooperative action in resolving international
2

Nile River, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC [hereinafter Nile River], https://www.nationalgeographic
.org/encyclopedia/nile-river/ [https://perma.cc/6ARW-3Q38] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
3
Id.
4
Ancient Egyptian civilization, KHAN ACAD., https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities
/world-history/world-history-beginnings/ancient-egypt-hittites/a/egypt-article [https://
perma.cc/5JAA-TU4G] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
5
An example of an early interstate conflict over water took place in 2500 and 2350 BC
between the Sumerian states of Lagash and Umma. See, e.g., Karen A. Rasler & William
R. Thompson, Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation, 50 INT’L
STUD. Q. 145, 145 (2006).
6
Gary Polakovic, Water Dispute on the Nile River Could Destabilize the Region, USC
NEWS (July 13, 2021), https://news.usc.edu/188414/nile-river-water-dispute-filling-dam
-egypt-ethiopia-usc-study/ [https://perma.cc/P8E2-ZBEB].
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Tamar Meshel & Moin A. Yahya, International Water Law and Fresh Water Dispute
Resolution: A Cosean Perspective, 92 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 510, 510–22 (2021).
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river disputes through international agreements.10 Furthermore, scholars analyzed the role of international organizations, such as the United
Nations and its bodies, in resolving international water disputes.11 They
discussed the role of the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) in
intervening to either induce cooperation or produce an order, through the
UNSC, to resolve a vexing international water dispute that may result in
erupting war.12 On the other hand, scholars scrutinized the spectrum of the
applicable standards on international water disputes.13 The substantive
standards are mostly found in international water law treaties.14 Yet, the
application of these standards has differed from one case to another.
While the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) frequently adopted the
equitable standard in the distribution of water resources among disputing
nations, the most successful cases resolved before the ICJ were those where
the Court applied either the “no significant harm” standard or a hybrid
standard, which encompasses both the equitable standard and the no significant harm standard.15 Scholars have reviewed, in depth, the application of the no significant harm standard and the equitable distribution
standard.16 Yet there remains a gap in the current literature with regards
to assessing how successful a holistic approach—that considers the history of the water resource, geography, significant harm, equitable standard,
prior appropriation, prior use, future use, and the interests of nations in
conflict—would be. We can find support for this holistic standard under
the latest U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which adopted an all-inclusive
standard encompassing multiple criteria such as states’ interests, pollution, waste, water force, equitable shares, and prior apportionment.17

10

Tamar Meshel, Swimming Against the Current: Revisiting the Principles of International Water Law in the Resolution of Fresh Water Disputes, 61 HARV. INT’L L.J., 135,
135–37 (2020).
11
Transboundary Waters, U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS (“UNDESA”) (Oct. 23, 2014),
https://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/transboundary_waters.shtml [https://perma.cc
/2XU9-NJFF].
12
James D. Fry & Agnes Chong, UN Security Council Resolution of International Water
Disputes, 50 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363, 364–68 (2019).
13
Eve Warburton, A Right, a Need, or an Economic Good? Debating our Relationship to
Water, COLUM. CLIMATE SCH.: STATE OF THE PLANET (June 6, 2011), https://news.climate
.columbia.edu/2011/06/06/a-right-a-need-or-an-economic-good-debating-our-relationship
-to-water/ [https://perma.cc/JN54-ZZWJ].
14
G.A. Res. 51/229, art. 5 (May 21, 1997).
15
See Meshel & Yahya, supra note 9, at 511–20.
16
Bernadette R. Nelson, Muddy Water Blues: How the Murky Doctrine of Equitable
Apportionment Should Be Refined, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1827, 1829, 1838–41 (2020).
17
Id. at 1829, 1843–44, 1846, 1850–51.
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This Article aims to review both international and domestic approaches to solving complex water disputes. It not only offers the best
mechanism of resolving international river disputes, but also attempts to
offer the most suitable substantive legal principles that have a successful
history in resolving such disputes.
First, this Article provides the factual matrix behind the EgyptEthiopia River dispute in Part I.18 In Part II, we will review and evaluate
the available methods of resolving international water disputes by hypothetically applying them to the Nile River dispute.19 These methods include
collaborative and cooperative international political negotiations through
river commissions, the engagement of the UNSC, and the role of the ICJ
in resolving international water disputes. In addition, we review international arbitration as a viable mechanism to resolve vexing international
water disputes.20 Finally, in Part III, we scrutinize the substantive principles applicable to water disputes on both the international and national
levels, using the United States as an example.21 We conclude by offering
our recommendations on resolving the Nile River dispute by applying the
most suitable mechanism and substantive standards.22
I.

THE FACTUAL MATRIX BEHIND THE EGYPTIAN-ETHIOPIAN NILE
RIVER DISPUTE

A.

A Brief History of the Nile River Dispute

The dispute over the Nile River is considered one of the most
complex water disputes in the world.23 The clash between Egypt and
Ethiopia started more than six decades ago when Ethiopia announced
that it seriously intended to build a huge dam to generate hydroelectric
energy to satisfy its domestic needs of electricity.24 The news was first
received with skepticism from Egypt since it was an undisputed fact that
18

See discussion infra Part I.
See discussion infra Part II.
20
See discussion infra Sections II.B.1–4.
21
See discussion infra Part III.
22
See discussion infra Conclusion.
23
Amira El-Fekki & Andrew James, Egypt and Ethiopia Clash Over Nile River Dam as
Water Scarcity Looms World-Wide, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/egypt-and-ethiopia-clash-over-nile-river-dam-as-water-scarcity-looms
-world-wide-11625925602 [https://perma.cc/SW4W-7SP3].
24
See id.
19
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Egypt had control over the Nile River since the Pharaonic Period.25 Yet,
Ethiopia’s intentions came to life when the construction workers began
building the Renaissance Dam.26 Since the 1950s, Egypt has threatened
Ethiopia with military action to deconstruct the dam.27 Nonetheless,
Ethiopia did proceed with no military consequences.28 The dam construction was completed during El-Sisi’s regime.29 El-Sisi—the current president of Egypt—also threatened Ethiopia with military action if they did
not stop filling a huge reservoir behind the Dam.30 Again, Ethiopia filled
a huge reservoir adjacent to the Dam to its peak after two phases of filling.31 The second of which was completed in July 2021.32
Disagreements between Egypt and Ethiopia have peaked in recent
33
years. These disagreements mainly concern how much water from the
Nile River each country shall be allotted.34 The African Union (“AU”),
alongside many African countries, have attempted to mediate those disagreements between Egypt and Ethiopia with no success.35 Egypt’s foreign
ministry has revealed, in a statement, that filling the reservoir adjacent
to the dam “threatens ‘security and peace’ in the region.”36 Egypt, unsatisfied with the AU efforts in resolving the river dispute, resorted to the
UNSC and the United States to intervene.37 After the UNSC convened
upon Egypt’s request, the UNSC’s only approach was to re-encourage
mediation and negotiations between the two countries through the AU.38
On the other hand, U.S. President Biden made clear that the United
States adopts a neutral stance towards Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia.39
The consequence of filling the Ethiopian Dam’s reservoir is paramount to Egypt. According to the ministry of irrigation, the Egyptian
population—estimated to be more than a 100 million—“consumes about
25

Id.
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
El-Fekki & James, supra note 23.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
El-Fekki & James, supra note 23.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
26
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84 billion cubic meters of water and needs 114 billion cubic meters of
water each year, with 55.5 billion cubic meters of which is coming from
the Nile.”40 Although Egypt recycles wastewater and desalinated seawater to make available fresh water, “the country depends on the Nile River
for more than 90% of its freshwater needs.”41
Ethiopia, on the other hand, wants to transform itself from an
agrarian to industrial economy through the dam.42 As a country of 115
million people, Ethiopia called the dam “the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam” (“GERD”) and decided to use it to close its electric energy deficit.43
The Nile River water originates from the upstream in Uganda and
Ethiopia and passes through multiple African countries before it reaches
Egypt, the final downstream country.44 Constructing a dam in an upstream
country is a frequent cause of erupting water disputes.45 This is because
it both affects water supply and quality in downstream countries, leaving
these countries with weak water force or polluted water.46 As a result,
countries on a river basin often have an international water management
agreement to regulate their water usage.47 Indeed, Egypt has international agreements with many African countries on the Nile River.48 The
oldest agreement in the modern era was concluded in 1929 by the United
Kingdom (which colonized most of North Africa at the time) to give Egypt
the right to veto any construction projects—even in upstream countries—
that may reduce Egypt’s share of the Nile River water.49 Further, according to a later agreement concluded in 1959, Egypt was entitled to 55.5
billion cubic meters of water of the Nile River each year and Sudan
received 18.5 billion cubic meters.50 Ethiopia’s storage capacity after
filling the reservoir to the dam is 74 billion cubic meters of water.51 Since

40

Id.
El-Fekki & James, supra note 23.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Nile River, supra note 2.
45
Robert Mandel, Sources of International River Basin Disputes, 12 J. CONFLICT STUD.
25, 26, 28, 30 (1992).
46
Id.
47
See id.
48
El-Fekki & James, supra note 23.
49
Ying Zhang et al., Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam: Implications for Downstream
Riparian Countries, 141 J. WATER RES. PLAN. MGMT. 1, 2 (2015), https://ascelibrary.org
/doi/full/10.1061/%28ASCE%29WR.1943-5452.0000520 [https://perma.cc/L3KL-KBBS].
50
El-Fekki & James, supra note 23.
51
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, Benishangul-Gumuz, WATER TECH., https://
41
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then, countries in the upstream have started to rebel against Egypt’s
control over the Nile River and its veto power to oppose any construction
projects.52 By 2010, there were more efforts among Nile basin countries
to bring Egypt’s control over the Nile River down after its influence
started to diminish.53
Not surprisingly, centuries ago, an Ethiopian emperor threatened
to cut of the Nile River flow to Egypt.54 Many centuries later, after the
former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak threatened Ethiopia with
military action if it decided to proceed with constructing a dam, he was
subject to a failed assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in 1995 during
his visit for a summit of African leaders.55 Ethiopia found a political
opening to build the giant dam amid Egypt’s Arab spring protests.56 In
2015, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan signed an agreement on cooperation
that included a seven-year timeline for filling the dam.57 While Egypt
and Sudan aimed for a binding accord, Ethiopia favored flexibility.58
Currently, the construction of the dam is near completion according to the United Nations (“UN”).59 Nonetheless, Egypt has exerted
sufficient efforts to modernize the country’s irrigation systems and to
reduce the possibility of drought.60 Yet, the dispute between Egypt and
Ethiopia has reached its peak due to its struggle to find a common
ground through negotiations, especially water management in times of
possible drought.61

www.water-technology.net/projects/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-africa/ [https://
perma.cc/MG6N-KTPK] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
52
JOHN WATERBURY, THE NILE BASIN: NATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
80 (2002).
53
Id. at 171.
54
Andrew Carlson, Who Owns the Nile? Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia’s History-Changing
Dam, 6 ORIGINS (Mar. 2013), https://origins.osu.edu/article/who-owns-nile-egypt-sudan
-and-ethiopia-s-history-changing-dam [https://perma.cc/PXN2-9NGY].
55
See El-Fekki & James, supra note 23; Aya Nader, Egypt Forced to Face Music, Sign
GERD Agreement: Mubarak’s Last Irrigation Minister, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (June 12,
2015), https://dailynewsegypt.com/2015/06/12/egypt-forced-to-face-music-sign-gerd-agree
ment-mubaraks-last-irrigation-minister/ [https://perma.cc/Z7AP-DYRY].
56
Basillioh Mutahi, Egypt-Ethiopia Row: The Trouble Over a Giant Nile Dam, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50328647 [https://perma.cc/2GZZ
-4B99].
57
El-Fekki & James, supra note 23.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
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What Happened at the United Nations Security Council Meeting?

During the UNSC meeting, the senior UN official for the Horn of
Africa advised that Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan should negotiate, in good
faith, their legitimate claims regarding the use of the Nile River.62 The
Chair of the AU—President Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic
of Congo—opined that although the history of negotiations over the
river’s use has been stagnating for more than a decade, the tensions have
substantially increased recently upon the construction of the dam.63 On
the other hand, the League of Arab States advised that Ethiopia shall
refrain from filling the reservoir until all countries reach an agreement
among them regarding the use of the Nile River.64 The executive director
of United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”)—Inger Andersen—
noted that the river has been the primary source of freshwater, agriculture, and livelihood for populations in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan for
thousands of years, yet the Ethiopian Dam will generate massive hydropower that would not only feed Ethiopia but could also feed the short
energy supply of the region.65 The three states have resorted to collaborative and cooperative engagement regarding the Nile River dispute, and
they signed an agreement on declaration of principles of “cooperation on
transboundary water resources” in 2015 (“2015 Agreement”).66 This triagreement aims for resolving the Nile River disputes peacefully under the
auspices of the AU.67 Yet the agreement mentioned no arrangements or
mechanisms for disputes regarding the consequences of the dam, such as
drought.68 During the UNSC meetings, some Council members took the
floor and noted that the dam’s potential for significant misunderstanding
and tension in the region cries for compromise among the three nations.69
In sum, most of the delegates at the UNSC meeting—by sharing
their historical experiences as similar riparian states—have emphasized

62

U.N. SCOR, 75th Sess., 8816th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/14576 (July 8, 2021) [hereinafter
Meeting Coverage], https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14576.doc.htm [https://perma.cc
/5TZC-JANB].
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Meeting Coverage, supra note 62.
69
Id.
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the importance of continuing peaceful cooperative negotiations among
the tri-states under the AU while they mainly recognized the tri-states’
shares in the Nile River.70 Mexico shared its experience in managing water
disputes by suggesting the International Boundary and Water Commission
(a 1989 agreement between the United States and Mexico) as a template
to resolve similar disputes among the tri-states.71 Sudan’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs made clear that although Sudan supported the construction of the Ethiopian Dam, the solo acts of Ethiopia regarding the Nile
River, such as filling its dam without informing Sudan and Egypt, may
substantially endanger both Sudan and Egypt.72
The Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasized that more
than 100 million Egyptians face an existential threat because Ethiopia
has unilaterally begun filling the dam.73 He added that Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to fill the dam is both a breach of international law and an
instrument of political control over the river.74 Finally, he called for adopting Tunisia’s draft resolution, which proposes an equitable agreement
within a defined timeline.75
Moreover, in the course of the UNSC meeting, Ethiopia’s Minister
for Water, Irrigation and Energy stated: “[N]one of us ought to stand thirsty
while watching the others drink.”76 He emphasized that both Egypt and
Sudan constructed dams and canals without regards to the rights of other
riparian countries.77
The UNSC meeting floated a few crucial points to the surface. First,
the three countries have failed to negotiate a settlement mechanism.78
After Sudan—supported by Egypt—proposed that mediation be conducted
by the AU, UN, the European Union (“EU”), and the United States,
Ethiopia suggested changes to the mediation scheme. This compromised
their ability to reach an agreement.79 Second, Ethiopia was reluctant to
adopt a drought mitigation agreement with Egypt and Sudan.80

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Meeting Coverage, supra note 62.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Meeting Coverage, supra note 62.
71

2022]
II.

THE RIGHT TO THE WORLD’S LONGEST RIVER

431

WHAT IS THE BEST MECHANISM AVAILABLE TO RESOLVE THE
NILE RIVER DISPUTE?

Notwithstanding the complexity of international river disputes,
many of the riparian states could settle or negotiate a water-management agreement without resorting to military action.81 In this part of the
Article, we attempt to understand the sources of international river disputes in order to resolve such disputes. We will first review the sources
of international river disputes.82 Then we will discuss the mechanisms
of resolving these disputes such as appointing a commission or resorting
to mediation, arbitration, or to the ICJ.83 After that, we will analyze the
substantive applicable principles that are often applied to resolve international river disputes.84 Finally, we will analyze the common scheme
among resolved water disputes to find the best combination of the most
successful dispute resolution mechanism and the best applicable substantive principle.85
A.

The Sources of International Water Disputes: Why Do We Have
Water Disputes?

In this section, we are not trying to outline all the reasons behind
the eruption of a water dispute. Rather, we attempt to focus on the main
dynamics that often lead to transforming a water-management problem
into a water dispute. Scholars point out that there are three main elements that may constitute the sources for water disputes.86 The first
element is a non-cooperative setting, which includes a predisposition to
perceive other states’ actions in a hostile way.87 This predisposition often
leads to impeding resolution of water disputes.88 The second element is
environmental imbalance, which is described by Mandel to be a major
source of impeding the resolution of water disputes due to building on
pre-existing antagonisms resulting from the gap between aspirations and
the reality of water access.89 When each riparian country attempts to
81

Mandel, supra note 45, at 26.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
83
See discussion infra Section II.B.
84
See discussion infra Part III.
85
See discussion infra Section III.E.
86
Mandel, supra note 45, at 26.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
82
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control the water resource in an antagonistic way, this leads to the
feeling of unfair distribution of the water resource and inequitable water
management that often does not meet the domestic needs of one of the
riparian states.90 Third, the power asymmetry itself is considered the
conflict—serving as a predicate to the previous two elements.91 The
power asymmetry causes riparian states to respond to the conflict in a
physical manner.92
Mandel applied the three elements on the Nile River dispute between Egypt and Sudan, which arose in 1952.93 At the time, Egypt’s construction of the Aswan Dam Project erupted in a dispute between Egypt
and Sudan.94 Although Egypt suggested that there would be equitable
water apportionment as a result of Egypt’s construction of the Aswan Dam,
Sudan resented Egypt’s move on constructing the Dam before consulting
with Sudan regarding the potential droughts or water shortages that
may result due to the Dam’s operation.95 Negotiations began between the
two countries in 1954, before a military confrontation took place, due to
several other political aspects, in 1958.96 Nonetheless, the Soviet Union,
which contributed to funding the Aswan Dam, influenced the new Sudanese regime to forego their water concerns.97 This led to the adoption of
the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters agreement in 1959, establishing
a Permanent Joint Technical Commission that made the river distribution between both states more equitable.98
Analyzing the history of the disputes between Egypt and Sudan,
Mandel argued that the three elements were the source of the Nile River
dispute.99 He found that Egypt and Sudan had a history of intense disputes over the Nile River.100 First, there were historical national antagonisms between Egypt and Sudan that influenced the Nile River dispute.
Yet, there was a chance for integrated river management as revealed by
the 1929 accord.101 Nonetheless, the second element—environmental
90

Id.
Id.
92
Mandel, supra note 45, at 26.
93
Id. at 42.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Mandel, supra note 45, at 42.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
91
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imbalances—has been more severe.102 Although both countries have faced
water scarcity, Egypt’s economy fully relies on the river since it is a desert
nation.103 Third, the power asymmetry between Egypt and Sudan was
present since Egypt was vastly stronger militarily and politically than
Sudan despite Sudan’s control over the upstream of the river.104 Finally,
Mandel predicted that as Egypt’s future needs of the Nile River would
grow, its dominance among riparian states would decrease, and its dependence on the upstream riparian would increase.105
After reviewing several international river disputes in light of the
three suggested elements, Mandel concluded that water dispute cases
involving human-initiated disruptions such as dams and water flow diversion caused more severe conflicts compared to cases involving ecological water apportionment.106
One could argue that the three elements suggested by Mandel are
present in the current Nile River dispute among Egypt, Sudan, and
Ethiopia. Historically, there has been national antagonism between the
three nations, especially because of the Nile River.107 Furthermore, there
has been even a greater national antagonism between Egypt and Ethiopia.
Since Ethiopia controlled the source of the Nile River, Egypt—as a
dominant political power in the region—has always felt threatened by
Ethiopia and has engaged in two lost wars with the latter.108 The national
antagonism is further influenced by the sentiment of Egyptians and Egyptian governments that Egypt owns the Nile River.109 This belief is a
102
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result of the historical domination of Egypt over the Nile River.110 Nonetheless, this belief does not stand scrutiny, at least under a geographical
analysis. This is because Egypt is—geographically—the last downstream
country on the Nile River Basin, while Ethiopia is an upstream country
that can control the source of the Nile River.111 Concerning environmental imbalance, while Ethiopia needs the dam to produce adequate energy
levels for its people, the consequence of the full operation of the dam will
lead to extreme shortages in Egypt’s share of the Nile River.112 As a
civilization built exclusively on the Nile River, this may lead to unavailability of fresh water for drinking, droughts, and a failure to meet the
agricultural needs of 100 million Egyptians.113 Each country has legitimate
interests in using the Nile River water.114 Yet the Egyptian interests
substantially prevail over the Ethiopian need for generating more electricity since it touches a fundamental need of fresh water, drinking, and
agriculture, rather than a secondary need, generating electricity.
The assessment of the power asymmetry among Egypt, Sudan,
and Ethiopia reveals that there is a close power tension between Egypt and
Ethiopia. While Egypt has the upper hand in military power,115 Ethiopia
has the exclusive control over the upstream source of the Nile River116—
the Egyptian vein of life.117 The tie in political powers between the two
nations make it ineffective to engage in war or threaten war. Since
military attacks and wars rarely—if ever—solve a river dispute,118 Ethiopia’s political power tips the scale since it controls what Egypt needs the
most—an equitable share of the Nile River.
It is worth noting that while the current Egypt-Ethiopia dispute
over the Nile River has similarities to the 1952 Egypt-Sudan dispute,
there is a key difference. Both disputes have erupted as a result of
human intervention—constructing a dam that may affect the river flow
110
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or quality.119 Further, in both disputes, the country constructing the
dam—whether it was Egypt or Ethiopia—failed to consult or adequately
notify the other riparian country.120 Yet both disputes have a remarkable
difference: Egypt was not the upstream country controlling the source of
the Nile River when it constructed the Aswan dam.121 Constructing a
dam in a downstream riparian country rarely creates issues regarding
the water supply or quality to upstream riparian countries, but not vice
versa.122 Accordingly, Sudan’s share of the Nile River in the Egypt-Sudan
dispute was not substantially affected by the Aswan Dam. On the other
hand, an upstream country controlling the source of the river—such as
Ethiopia—constructing a dam is almost always a problem to all countries
in the river basin, and especially to the last downstream country.123 As
we discussed above, the Ethiopian Dam reservoir would deprive Egypt of
thousands of cubic meters—reducing its Nile River share exponentially.124
Further, constructing a dam at the upstream source country often leads
to significant pollution and reduction of the water quality that reaches
the last downstream country.125
Yet, we argue that there is a fourth important element that could
be the primary source of water disputes: the absence of a multilateral or
bilateral binding international treaty for regulating water management
by the river basin riparian countries.126 Although the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses (“UNWC”) was adopted in May 1997, it still lacks the necessary number of ratifications by member states to become a binding
agreement.127 Although such agreements may be subject to construing
disputes, they shorten the mediation path to resolving an interpretation
dispute rather than going east and west to convince stakeholders to
agree on the applicable substantive standards.128

119

Mandel, supra note 45, at 42.
Id.
121
Id. at 43.
122
Id. at 28.
123
See id.
124
See Damian Zane, River Nile Dam: Why Ethiopia Can’t Stop It Being Filled, BBC (July 8,
2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53432948 [https://perma.cc/9ZDE-JJS6].
125
Mandel, supra note 45, at 28.
126
See Salman M. A. Salman, Mediation of International Water Disputes—the Indus, the
Jordan, and the Nile Basins Interventions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FRESHWATER: THE
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES 360, 360 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al. eds., 2013).
127
Id.
128
See id. at 361.
120

436

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:421

In conclusion, comprehending the sources of water disputes is the
first step towards finding the best solution to resolving such disputes.
This is because international river disputes often involve diverse historical, geographical, and political factors, as discussed above.129
B.

The Most Suitable Mechanism to Resolve the Nile River Dispute

The current scholarship suggests multiple mechanisms and applicable standards to resolve international river disputes. Some scholars
argue that the most suitable method of resolving water disputes is through
collaborative governance, that often takes place through negotiations or
mediation.130 Other scholars emphasize the role of the UNSC in resolving
these disputes by issuing binding orders—especially in cases that may
develop into armed conflict.131 Almost all scholars agree on the importance of peaceful negotiations, mediation, or conciliation to sustainably
resolve water management disputes.132 Yet, scholars have also discussed
the role of the ICJ and international arbitration in resolving disputes
that cannot be resolved through peaceful political means such as negotiation and mediation.133
In this section, we will discuss the collaborative (mediation and
negotiation) mechanisms on one hand and UNSC intervention, litigation
(ICJ), or international arbitration on the other. Our goal here is to review
both available mechanisms for resolving complex international river
disputes such as the Nile River dispute. Thus, we will attempt to apply
each mechanism to the factual matrix of the Egypt-Ethiopia dispute over
the Nile River to find and treat the shortcomings of each mechanism.
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Resolving the Nile River Dispute Through Negotiation and
Mediation

Collaborative governance has received considerable attention by
academics.134 This method emphasizes the participation of the public,
private, and voluntary stakeholders in negotiations involving resolving
water disputes.135 Collaborative governance methods are praised for
ensuring that the suggested solutions are fair, equitable, and representative of all interests of stakeholders.136 They are also considered by some
scholars to be the best mechanisms since they can resolve very complex
water disputes by honoring competing interests.137 This method was
adopted successfully in resolving the Colorado River Basin dispute.138
Collaborative governance often takes place through negotiation
or mediation.139 Once a transboundary water conflict erupts, states often
resort to negotiation due to the vagueness of international water law and
the low costs involved in negotiation as opposed to legal mechanisms.140
The most common method of resolving a water dispute under negotiation
is to appoint a joint commission.141 The Madrid Declaration, the 1923
Geneva Convention, and the Helsinki Rules provide for permanent joint
commissions as a mechanism to resolve water disputes.142 Nonetheless,
negotiation—as a mechanism—often fails to resolve water disputes when
there is a gap in power between both sides at the negotiation table.143
Further, negotiation can only be successful when there is an intent to
compromise on both sides.144 In the absence of such intent, negotiation
complicates and prolongs water disputes with no avail.145
134
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Mediation, on the other hand, is considered one of the most important mechanisms in resolving water disputes.146 Mediation usually
involves a third party to facilitate the dialogue among the riparian countries in resolving their river dispute.147 Further, a third party may intervene and refine the parties’ proposals to narrow the gap between them
or conduct an investigation to present its own solutions to stakeholders,
which is often known as conciliation.148 One of the most successful river
disputes resolved through conciliation/mediation is the Indus River mediation, where the World Bank was the third party managing the mediation of the dispute between India and Pakistan.149 The mediation efforts
conducted by the World Bank involving Pakistan and India resulted in the
Indus Waters Treaty,150 which allocated the Eastern rivers of the Indus
to India and Western Rivers of the Indus to Pakistan.151 The treaty further
established the Permanent Indus Commission to oversee a sustained
implementation of the treaty and proposed binding methods of resolving
future disputes regarding questions or differences arising out of the
treaty.152 Some scholars argue that the success of this conciliation was
due to the active involvement of the World Bank personnel at the highest
level, who established personal and continuous relationships with both
countries’ highest officials while resolving the river dispute.153 The World
Bank further appointed an engineering adviser to work with the engineering advisers of both countries.154 Furthermore, both countries highly
respected the mediation process and were committed to finding a common solution.155
The basis for such mediation in international law can be tracked
to the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899), which stipulates in Article 2 that: “In respect of serious
disagreement or conflict, before an appeal to arms, the Signatory Powers
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agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices
or mediation of one or more friendly Powers.”156 Scholars point out that
these methods include “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”157 Moreover, UNWC
Article 33(2) first suggests resorting to an agreement between the conflicting states before applying the treaty’s suggested mechanisms. The
treaty provides that:
If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation requested by one of them, they may jointly seek the
good offices of, or request mediation or conciliation by, a
third party, or make use, as appropriate of any joint watercourse institutions that may have been established by
them or agree to submit the dispute to arbitration or to
the International Court of Justice.158
Unlike the language of both treaties, we argue that arbitration is
not one of the collaborative mechanisms of resolving water disputes. This
is because arbitration—same as litigation—often results in one winning
party that takes all.159 In contrast, in mediation—which is considered a
more developed form of negotiation—both countries seek to compromise
to find an equitable and fair allocation of the river water.160 Nonetheless,
the drawback of mediation is that it is not legally binding like arbitration
or litigation—at least until a treaty is signed by disputing parties.161 Thus,
mediation requires good faith and a commitment to resolve the water
dispute by both competing sides.162 If such commitment is lacking, one
country may not accept mediation or the mediator, or neglect the mediator’s
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findings and suggestions altogether.163 Nonetheless, the importance of
mediation in resolving international river disputes remains undeniable
for two prominent reasons. First, it is the most resorted to method when
both disputants reach a stalemate or are out of options.164 Second, both
disputants are likely to compromise and offer concessions to resolve the
dispute through a third party rather than directly offering compromises
to each other.165
Susskind and Babbitt opined that there are five preconditions for
effective international mediation:
(a) disputants must realize that they are unlikely to get
what they want through unilateral action; (b) the alternative to agreement must involve unacceptable economic or
political costs; (c) the representatives of the disputants must
have enough authority to speak for whom they represent;
(d) other international or regional interests with a stake in
the dispute must exert pressure for a resolution; and (e) a
mediator must be available who is acceptable to all sides.166
Thus, the choice of a third-party mediator becomes the first most important step towards resolving a river dispute through mediation.167 In most
successfully resolved international river disputes, the UN, or one of the
respected regional organizations, handled the mediation between the
disputant countries.168
The timeline of the GERD Dam Negotiations can be summarized
as follows:
(1)
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agreed to form a committee of experts to study the
impact of the dam.170
May 2012, the committee—which is comprised of
Egyptian, Ethiopian, Sudanese, and international
experts171—began its assessment of the impact of
the GERD dam on Egypt and Sudan.172
June 2014, the President of Egypt asked the Ethiopian Prime Minster to resume negotiations at the
African Union Summit.173
August 2014, the Egyptian and Ethiopian ministers of irrigation formed National Experts Committee (Tripartite National Committee) to accomplish
the recommendations of the international committee
of experts.174
November 2017, the Tripartite National Committee
meeting was hosted in Cairo with no success after
fourteen rounds of consultation due to the Ethiopian
rejection of the guidelines proposed.175
December 2017, Egypt suggested to include the
World Bank as a mediator in the Tripartite Committee of Experts.176 Ethiopia declined in 2018.177
April 2018, foreign affairs ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan met at Khartoum to negotiate, but
they did not reach an agreement.178
September 2018, the Tripartite Committee of Experts met with the irrigation Ministers of the three
states and failed to reach an agreement.179
November 2019, the three states agreed to meet in
Washington D.C., in 2020, to resume talks with the
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participation of the World Bank and the United
States.180
December 2019, the three states attended the second technical meeting in Cairo to tackle the rules of
filling the reservoir in times of drought, extended
drought, and refill, and the coordination needed
among the three states.181
January 2020, the three states met at Washington
D.C., to conclude a further technical meeting.182
The delegations reached an agreement providing
for a timetable to fill the reservoir including times
of drought.183 This agreement is in conjunction with
the Declaration of Principles on the GERD that was
concluded in 2015.184

By reviewing the factual matrix of the current Nile River dispute
between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, we reach several alarming findings. Egypt and Ethiopia have been negotiating the construction of the
Ethiopian Dam for more than a decade with no success until 2015—when
Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia signed The Declaration of Principles on the
GERD in Khartoum.185 Yet, Ethiopia had taken unilateral actions by
constructing the dam and filling its reservoir in a direct breach of the
agreement—without first informing Egypt and Sudan.186 In fact, Ethiopia
has a history of not joining the Nile River Basin management agreements.187 The only agreement signed by Ethiopia before was the Cairo
Cooperation Framework of July 1993, in which “both countries pledged
not to implement water projects harmful to the interests of the other and
consult over projects to reduce waste and increase the flow of waters,”
and the cooperation agreement signed in 2015.188
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Furthermore, Egypt and Sudan have proposed a third-party mediator multiple times (the World Bank or the United States), and Ethiopia
blatantly rejected both and chose to stick to the AU’s unsuccessful negotiations.189 High national antagonism between Egypt and Sudan was revealed through Ethiopia’s comments at the UNSC meeting, when Ethiopia
pointed out that downstream countries construct dams, and it should not
be the only one thirsty, and neglecting the fact that it is an upstream
country controlling the source of the Nile River.190 In addition, Ethiopia’s
insistence that the AU be the only mediator does not stand scrutiny.191
While the AU has more knowledge about the peculiarities of African
nations, the World Bank and the United States possess considerable
expertise and resources to conduct successful mediation proceedings.192
The World Bank has mediated many successful international river
disputes, such as the Indus River dispute.193 Further, the United States
has considerable experience in mediating interstate water disputes
through adopting compacts and a thorough body of applicable standards
that were developed over the years by the U.S. Supreme Court decisions—as discussed in depth below.194 If Ethiopia was committed to
resolving the Nile River dispute, it would have accepted either the World
Bank or the United States as a mediator or a conciliator.195 At the very
least, Ethiopia should have informed Egypt and Sudan before it began
filling the GERD dam reservoir. Failing to inform them in accordance
with the 2015 agreement constitutes a direct breach of both the agreement
and international law.196 Further, Ethiopia’s reluctance to engage the
World Bank as mediator or conciliator does not show any sign of cooperation or good faith. Again, as we discussed above, the first step towards a
successful negotiation or mediation is good faith.197 If one of the parties
cannot compromise on the mediator, they are not expected to reach a
compromising agreement regarding water shares of the Nile River. This
189
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begs the question, if one disputant country is not willing to cooperate in
resolving a water dispute through negotiation or mediation, how can
such a dispute be resolved peacefully?
2.

The Potential Role of the United Nations Security Council in
Resolving the Nile River Dispute

Although there is extreme variation between scholars on whether
water disputes lead to armed conflicts, this variation is a result of how
scholars define an “armed conflict.”198 Scholars who argue that water
disputes often lead to an armed conflict adopt an expansive definition of
armed conflict that often includes deploying soldiers at the border.199 In
contrast, the other group of scholars adopt a restrictive definition of
armed conflict that only includes waged wars.200
The UNSC involvement in international river disputes finds its
basis in its authority to respond to threats to international security under
the UN Charter.201 In cases of potential threats to international security,
the UNSC may suspend the application of international treaties and substitute it with other international obligations.202 Specifically, regarding
water disputes, the UNSC had suspended and substituted international
obligations in at least eight international water disputes.203 Although the
UNSC is not considered a source of international water law, its coercive
powers under the UN Charter allow it to create and impose new water
law that can suspend and substitute existing treaty obligations.204 Thus,
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the UNSC resolutions regarding international water disputes are binding on contesting member states.205 This authority of the UNSC has also
been confirmed by the ICJ in the Lockerbie case, which emphasized that
the UNSC resolutions passed under Chapter VII trump conflicting treaty
rights and obligations.206 It is worth noting that the UNSC involvement
through issuing resolutions under Chapter VII does not negate the ICJ
jurisdiction over the dispute nor does it make the dispute inadmissible
before the Court.207
Fry and Chong analyzed six instances where the UNSC used its
Chapter VII powers to resolve non-navigational international water disputes.208 They noted that all these instances involved an ill-will from one
nation to deny the other its right to a regular supply of water.209
One relevant incident where the UNSC intervened under Chapter
VII involved Yemen.210 In 2011, Yemen faced an emergency as a result
of suffering severe water shortages due to inefficient water usage with
farming practices that led to a decreased supply in mountain springs.211
As a result, the UNSC adopted the Resolution No. 2014, citing its “primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
under the Charter of the United Nations,” and expressing its serious
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concern regarding the difficult access to safe water.212 The UNSC also
demanded that the Yemeni authorities’ acts comply with humanitarian and
human rights laws.213 Further, the UNSC passed the Resolution 2402 in
2018 to renew the call for applying such humanitarian obligations to
preserve the right to life and dignity of the Yemeni people.214 The Yemeni
water shortage is relevant to our research because there were allegedly
Saudi-led attacks on a Yemeni bottled water plant and a pipe factory in
2015 and 2016, which led to the death of thousands of Yemeni, due to
water-related fighting.215 Although there are no similar attacks from the
Ethiopian side on the Nile River share of Egypt or Sudan, the construction
of the Ethiopian Dam and its huge reservoir amounts to a strategic attack
on a shared water resource that may lead to similarly devastating humanitarian atrocities. Yet, the UNSC resolutions failed to resolve the situation, and Yemeni are still suffering from water shortages to this day.216 Our
assertion is also emphasized by the UNSC’s latest approach in Resolution
No. 2216, which called for the implementation of Gulf Cooperation Council
Initiative and resuming “national dialogue” instead of issuing a binding
resolution to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.217 Nonetheless,
Fry and Chong argue that these resolutions are—at least theoretically—
binding in nature since they were issued under Chapter VII.218 However,
they do not suggest a back-up mechanism to resolve non-compliance with
UNSC Chapter VII resolutions calling for compliance with international
humanitarian law and human rights law obligations.
Another relevant situation where the UNSC intervened under
Chapter VII to resolve a water-related situation concerned Syria.219 In
2011, Syria suffered from a severe drought that forced more than 1.5 million people to flee from rural areas and find a new life in the urban parts
of Syria.220 The water shortage was a result of a damaged main water pipeline in Aleppo, cutting the supply of around 3 million people.221 In 2012,
rebels took control over an important hydroelectric dam in Syria.222
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Further, rebels obstructed a key spring in Damascus and al-Qaeda fighters
bombed the main water pipeline in Aleppo.223 These consecutive attacks on
key water resources in Syria resulted in the shortage of water supply to
Syrians and the contamination of available water.224 As a result, many
Syrians got sick from contaminated water.225 In 2015, rebels controlled a
key spring in Damascus, which reduced Damascus’s water supply by ninety
percent.226 Finally, Russian forces wrongfully bombed a water treatment
facility near Aleppo cutting off the water supply to over 3 million people.227
The UN Secretary General noted that siege and starvation is considered a
war tactic since the Syrian Government, Islamic State Iraq and the Levant,
rebels, and the Nusrah Front used water as a weapon of war.228 In 2016, it
was estimated that 7.7 million civilians were affected by water cuts.229
The UNSC issued a resolution, which revealed its grave concern over the
situation in Syria.230 The UNSC “demanded that all parties, in particular
the Syrian authorities, immediately comply with their obligations under
international law, including international humanitarian law . . . .”231 This
included accesses to water. Again, the UNSC president clarified the connection between water shortages and international humanitarian law when
he stated that he “call[ed] on all parties to fully respect their obligations
under international humanitarian law and to take all appropriate steps
to protect civilians, including by desisting from attacks directed against civilian objects, such as medical centers, schools and water stations. . . .”232
Fry and Chong argued that the UNSC resolution called stakeholders in Syria to comply with Resolutions 2191 and 2258 of 2014 and
2015, and 2464 of 2018, which “call[ed] on all parties to the Syrian domestic
conflict to . . . respect international humanitarian law.”233 They also noted
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that the UNSC classification of the water shortages dispute in Syria as
a domestic one was a result of political reasons due to Russia’s membership in the UNSC.234 Yet it does not negate the fact that the UNSC
imposed an obligation on all states to comply with international humanitarian laws in water disputes.235
Accordingly, it is foreseeable that the UNSC may intervene in the
Egypt-Ethiopia dispute over the Nile River if the complexity of the dispute
meets a certain threshold. If the UNSC intervened, it will likely issue a
binding resolution to refer the dispute to a specific mediator or conciliator
(such as the World Bank).236 The UNSC may use its Chapter VII powers
to ensure compliance with its binding resolution.237 Moreover, as discussed above, the UNSC often prioritizes vital humanitarian needs over
industrial or electric needs.238 In other words, if the UNSC intervened,
it is more likely to side with Egypt due to the probability of a water shortage that will gradually result from the GERD dam and reservoir usage.
Since water shortage relates to vital human needs in Egypt, such as the
availability of drinking water and agriculture, it will take priority over
Ethiopia’s interest in generating excessive electricity in Ethiopia.239
Nonetheless, that does not mean that the UNSC may order the deconstruction of the GERD dam or emptying of the reservoir, but rather it may
require managing the reservoir and the dam in a way that guarantees a
sufficient water flow to Egypt.240
3.

The International Court of Justice as a Judicial Mechanism
Available to Resolve the Nile River Dispute

The ICJ has jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising between UN
member states.241 Not surprisingly, many of these disputes involve water
disputes arising between nations contesting each others’ right to a shared
water resource.242 There is a consensus among scholars that these disputes are very complex in nature.243
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One of the most famous ICJ water dispute cases is the GabcikovoNagymaros case.244 The factual matrix behind the case began in 1977,
when Hungary and Czechoslovakia signed a treaty to construct dams and
other projects alongside the Danube River bordering the two nations.245
The case concerned a water dispute between Hungary and
Czechoslovakia regarding two barrages constructed by the latter on the
Danube River under a treaty concluded in 1977, between both countries.246 The construction of the two barrages began in the late 1970s.247
In the mid-1980s, environmental groups in Hungary claimed the project
had a negative impact on the environment and organized protests against
building the barrages.248 These protests led to the discontinuation of
constructing the barrages by the Hungarian Government in 1989.249 In
contrast, Czechoslovakia argued that there were no negative environmental impacts resulting from constructing the barrages and proceeded
unilaterally with building a single barrage on its side.250 However, the
construction of the single barrage required the diversion of a considerable amount of the Danube River.251 Czechoslovakia justified that diversion on the basis of the 1977 treaty.252 Consequently, Hungary decided
to terminate the 1977 treaty based on ecological necessity and the unilateral action taken by Czechoslovakia.253 The dispute became even more
complex when Czechoslovakia split into two countries (the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, or Slovakia), where the agreement’s effect
passed to Slovakia allowing it to own the Czechoslovakian part of the
project.254 Slovakia also constructed dams on the Danube and diverted its
waters into its territory.255 In April 1993, after negotiations had failed
between the two countries, the dispute was referred to the ICJ—under
the pressure of the Commission of the European Communities.256 At the
time, it was the first international water dispute to be referred to and
244
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decided by the ICJ.257 The ICJ resorted to the law of treaties, state responsibility, environmental law, sustainable development, and international watercourses laws to issue a decision in this complex case.258 The
Court ruled in 1997, that both countries erred.259 Hungary was not
entitled to terminate the 1977 treaty on ecological necessity grounds or
suspend the work on the project in 1989 on environmental grounds.260 On
the other hand, Czechoslovakia, and later Slovakia, was not entitled to
develop the project without Hungary’s agreement.261
The ICJ reasoning behind the decision was that the use, development, and protection of an international watercourse shall take place in an
equitable and reasonable manner that respects cooperation between both
nations.262 Accordingly, the ICJ found that Hungary was deprived of its
right to an equitable and reasonable share of the Danube River because
Czechoslovakia unilaterally constructed the barrage.263 The Court advised
both countries to resume the joint regime to achieve the treaty’s objectives
and common utilization of shared water resources.264 Thus, Czechoslovakia
was not authorized to proceed without Hungary’s consent.265
In the Nile River case, Egypt may refer the dispute to the ICJ
since Ethiopia breached the 2015 agreement—specifically Articles III, IV,
and V.266 Article III of the 2015 agreement stipulates:
The three countries will take all necessary measures to
avoid causing a significant harm while using the Blue
Nile/main river. In case a significant harm occurs to one
of the states, the state that caused such harm—in the
absence of an agreement on that act—must take all suitable measures in coordination with the harmed state to
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alleviate or inhibit the harm and discuss the compensation
matter, if suitable.267
Further, Article IV provides for the guidelines necessary to share the
Nile River water impartially, including:
The elements of geography, water geography, water, climate, environment, and other natural elements, social and
economic needs of the concerned basin countries, the residents who depend on the water resources in each of the
basin countries, impact of the use of water resources in one
of the basin countries on fellow basin countries, the existing and possible uses of water resources, and the factors
of preservation, protection, development, economics of
water resources use, and the cost of measures taken for
the matter, the extent of alternatives availability—given
the existence of comparative value—for planned or limited
use, the extent of each state’s contribution in the Nile River
system, and the extension and surface percentage of the
basin in each basin state.268
Finally, Article V calls for the cooperation of the three states in the first
filling and management of the Dam reservoir, their respect and enforcement of the Tripartite Committee’s recommendations, and informing the
other two states before initiating the process of filling the reservoir.269
The main dispute does not only concern the breach of different
articles in the 2015 agreement, but also what constitutes an equitable
water share for Egypt and whether the GERD dam poses a significant
harm to Egypt or Sudan. According to Egypt, the dam can reduce Egypt’s
share of the Nile River water by 55.5 billion cubic meters.270 On the other
hand, Ethiopia insists that the dam will not harm downstream countries.271 Thus, Egypt may resort to the ICJ to claim that it may face a
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significant harm if Ethiopia continues acting unilaterally and fully using
the reservoir.
Nonetheless, states, including Egypt, may be reluctant to resort
to the ICJ for many reasons. First, the international water law remains
vague especially with regards to key aspects in resolving water disputes.272
Second, the ICJ has a limited ability to review scientific and technical
data, which is indispensable in resolving water disputes.273 The latter
reason can be observed vividly in both the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case
and the Pulp Mills case.274 In the Nagymaros case, the ICJ failed to evaluate data regarding the quality and amount of water needed to maintain
an environmental balance.275 In the Mills case, the ICJ placed insufficient
weight on experts’ testimonies.276 On the other hand, the ICJ judges—while
experts in international law—often lack technical knowledge regarding
water disputes, which leaves the matter to the parties’ experts, who
might be biased.277 Moreover, many water disputes need a hybrid legalpolitical approach that considers equity, rather than a strict legal approach that only applies the letter of law.278 Finally, the ICJ decisions,
despite being legally binding, sometimes are unenforceable due to the
state’s reluctance to obey international law.279 And if Ethiopia has been
reluctant to observe the current 2012 treaty with Egypt and Sudan, it
may also be reluctant to uphold the international rule of law by enforcing
an ICJ decision rendered against it.
Accordingly, although Egypt may refer the Nile River dispute to
the ICJ, this expensive mechanism of resolving the Nile River dispute may
not reach a successful result at the end.280 Even if the current Ethiopian
administration agreed to enforce an ICJ decision, a future administration
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may not.281 Thus, sustainable cooperative mechanisms are highly preferable to litigation when it comes to resolving water disputes.
4.

Should Egypt Refer the Nile River Case to International
Arbitration?

In the last century, international arbitration became one of the
most efficient mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution.282 This is
due to the flexibility, technical expertise, less formality, and speed it
offers to disputants that are not available in litigation.283 Nonetheless,
arbitration has rarely been used in resolving water disputes.284 Yet the
Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources
and/or the Environment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”)
offers a fertile ground for states to resolve their environmental disputes,
including water disputes.285 Notwithstanding the novelty and importance
of these rules, only six environmental cases were commenced under them,
and none of the cases concerned a water dispute.286 Furthermore, governments were never a party in any of these cases, except indirectly in one
case where a governmental agency was a party.287 In other words, these
rules, despite being adequate to some extent, exist without the existence
of a proper mechanism to apply them, unless parties request their application by an international arbitration tribunal.288
Although there have been very few wars related to water disputes
in the last few centuries, it is worth noting that over 150 water-related
conflicts have been recorded between 1900–2010, and sixty percent of the
world’s international river basins are neither controlled nor regulated
under a cooperative management framework that may avoid future
conflicts.289 Regardless, it is foreseeable that there will be violent wars
in the future as a direct result of the increasing water demand for limited
water resources.290 This is because “[w]ater is one of the few scarce
281
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resources for which there is no substitute, over which there is poorly
developed international law . . . .”291
A water dispute that is referable to international arbitration must
meet a certain threshold: “a sufficient level of conflictual interaction between disputing states.”292 This is measured by the rules stipulated by
the Conflict and Peace Databank’s (“COPDAB”) International Co-operation
and Conflict Scale.293 Under these rules, disputes may meet the gravity
threshold without involving situations of formal declarations of war or
military acts.294 Thus, a dispute may be considered a serious water conflict
in a situation that involves “strong verbal expressions displaying hostility,” “diplomatic-economic hostile actions,” or “political-military hostile
actions,” defined under the COPDAB scale.295 On the other hand, “mild
verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction” or “neutral or nonsignificant acts for the inter-nation situation” do not meet the threshold
to constitute a water dispute.296
It is worth noting that the current legal framework regulating
water disputes is based on the limited territorial sovereignty doctrine.297
This doctrine dictates that no state shall adopt an internal water policy
that may significantly harm another riparian state.298 Thus, the limited
territorial sovereignty doctrine serves as a “mutual limitation of sovereign rights” and combines two core substantive principles: equitable and
reasonable utilization and no significant harm.299 Although the equitable
and reasonable utilization principle is regarded as the basic standard by
most water law experts, both principles act as two faces of the same coin.300
Yet, aside from the substantive principles, the most common theme behind
resolving water disputes through arbitration is the spirit of negotiation
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and compromise of arbitrators.301 Thus, arbitrators in water disputes combine both the legal dimension and the diplomatic dimension of mediation,
negotiation, and compromise.302 Arbitration, in its very structure, is the
only mechanism that can combine legal procedures and bindingness on
one hand and negotiation/mediation on the other hand.303 Accordingly,
arbitrators who consider water disputes often act as diplomats besides
acting as lawyers; combining both approaches often leads to rendering
an effective and fair outcome.304 Although many scholars only prefer the
purely judicial version of arbitration, the hybrid nature of arbitration
often renders the best results in resolving complex water disputes.305
Arbitration—as a mechanism—succeeds in resolving many water
disputes due to multiple reasons related to its unique structure.306 First,
parties before an arbitral tribunal do not share the same negative sentiments associated with litigation at the ICJ such as prestige or competition of power.307 Second, the arbitral tribunal is established only to resolve
the dispute referred to it, which makes it more prepared, specialized, and
neutral.308 Third, in arbitration, states may choose their decision makers,
allowing them to appoint arbitrators who have expertise in the subject
matter of the dispute.309 Thus, this advantage overcomes the lack of
technical expertise of ICJ judges.310 Since, by their very nature, water
disputes often involve technical aspects, appointing arbitrators who have
technical expertise in water issues fills the gap created by both the ICJ
as a judicial system and mediation/negotiation as a diplomatic solution.311
Furthermore, parties to the arbitration retain considerable control over
the arbitral process, including the procedural and substantive rules
applicable by the tribunal.312 In addition, they can determine the rules
301
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applicable to evaluating scientific and technical evidence.313 Finally, the
arbitral tribunal may apply the rules of equity besides resorting to international water law.314
Referring the Nile River dispute to arbitration would require the
presence of an arbitration agreement in any international treaty between
Egypt and Ethiopia.315 Since the 2015 agreement only mentions conciliation, mediation, and referring the Nile River dispute to the heads of state,
arbitration—at least initially—is not an available mechanism to resolve
the Nile River dispute.316 Nonetheless, arbitration can still be possible if
Egypt and Ethiopia agreed to adopt a new arbitration agreement as a
contractual matter that is separate and independent of the presence of
an international agreement between them. If Ethiopia does not agree to
conclude an arbitration agreement, Egypt will have no choice but to refer
the dispute to conciliation or to the ICJ. A recommended option to both
sides is to refer the Nile River dispute to conciliation by selecting esteemed scholars of international water law and experts as conciliators.
Nonetheless, we argue that if the current negotiation and mediation under the supervision of the AU led to the conclusion of an arbitration
agreement, referring the Nile River dispute to international arbitration
would constitute the best possible solution. Since mediation, negotiation,
and conciliation need an intent to compromise, and litigation needs respecting and abiding by the international rule of law, Ethiopia’s reluctance
to compromise or to respect international rule of law leaves the Nile River
dispute with no viable mechanism for resolution except international
arbitration. If Egypt referred the Nile River dispute to international arbitration, Ethiopia would be bound to appear before the tribunal and to
enforce its decision.317 Unlike respecting the ICJ decisions, the enforcement of arbitral awards is stipulated by the Washington Convention and
New York Convention, which Ethiopia is a party to.318
We conclude that arbitration is the most effective mechanism to
resolve the Nile River dispute. Yet if both disputant countries could not
313
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adopt an arbitration agreement to allow them to refer the Nile River dispute to arbitration, conciliation becomes the second-best option. However,
if neither Ethiopia nor Egypt has a serious intent to compromise, the ICJ
becomes the only peaceful option to resolve the Nile River dispute. After
discussing the most effective mechanisms, the next logical step is to assess
different substantive rules governing water disputes to choose the most
effective substantive standards to resolve the Nile River dispute.
III.

WHAT IS THE MOST SUITABLE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD TO
RESOLVE THE NILE RIVER DISPUTE?

Historically, substantive standards governing water disputes resolution evolved drastically. First, under the prevailing prior appropriation
standard, whoever makes use of the water first, enjoys prevailing property rights to the water share.319 Second, under the priority of water use
standard, water used for drinking and agriculture is worth more than
water used for generating electricity.320 Third, under the equitable apportionment standard, water shall be shared equitably and fairly between
the disputant states.321 Finally, under the appreciable harm and significant harm standards, no state shall use its water share in a way that
significantly harms the other riparian state.322 Regarding the last two
standards, scholars are split into two groups on evaluating the current
best substantive standards applicable to water disputes.323 The first
group of scholars has found that the best applicable standard is the
equitable and fair distribution standard.324 A second group of scholars
argues for the significant harm standard over the equitable standard in
319
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resolving water disputes.325 By resorting to the U.S. Resolution of Interstate Water Disputes, we find a holistic approach standard adopted to
resolve complex water disputes. In this Part, we will scrutinize the substantive standards applicable to water disputes in order to reach the best
available substantive standard to resolve the Nile River dispute.326
A.

Prior Appropriation as a Standard of Water Share Entitlement

Known as “first in time, first in right,” the prior appropriation doctrine states that water rights are determined by senior priority of beneficial use or purpose.327 Prior appropriation treats water resources much
differently from riparian rights that water-rich eastern, southern, and
midwestern states follow.328 This legal doctrine was developed in waterscarce southwestern and western states.329 These water rights are considered a type of property right, which can be bought and sold separately
from land.330 To claim the water, a user must simply divert the water for
some purpose and use it for a reason that is beneficial.331 The first entity
to use the water (“senior appropriator”) obtains a right to the water
resources (the “priority”) against a future user (“junior appropriator”).332
However, the junior appropriator can file a claim against the senior
appropriator if they make a change to the flow of the water resources
that materially injures the junior user (“no injury rule”).333 Yet, the claim
of injury is not absolute—certain changes in water use that impact downstream flows may occur even though they may harm the junior consumer.334
A key aspect of prior appropriation rights is the concept of “beneficial
325

See McIntyre, supra note 323, at 601.
See infra Section III.A.
327
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 176 (1982).
328
Riparian rights belong to the land that is contiguous with the water resources. The
landowner is entitled to use them unimpeded as far as quantity and quality of water
(“natural flow theory”) but must use them in such a manner that respects the needs of
other appropriators (“reasonable use theory”). See id. at 196 n.4; see also Peter A. Fahmy,
Colorado v. New Mexico II: Judicial Restraint in the Equitable Apportionment of Interstate
Waters, 62 DENV. L. REV. 858, 858 n.11 (2021).
329
Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENV’T L. 517, 558
(2007).
330
Id.
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Colorado, 459 U.S. at 179 n.4.
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See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 378 (2011) (holding that the “doctrine
of appropriation in Wyoming and Montana allows appropriators to improve the efficiency
of their irrigation systems, even to the detriment of downstream appropriators.”).
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Id. at 378–79.
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use.”335 The legal principle was developed in common law but has been
codified in many western states’ statutes and constitutions.336 Beneficial
use in water governance regimes has two concepts—water users: (1) must
not waste water resources; and (2) must continuously use their water
resources for a productive purpose (e.g., agriculture, mining, etc.).337
Historically, Egypt is the first country in Africa to make use of the
Nile River water; the Nile River became the cornerstone of the early
Egyptian Pharaonic Civilization.338 For centuries, Egypt maintained exclusive control over the Nile River.339 Thus, Egypt has the ultimate right
to the Nile River under the prior appropriation theory.340 Even under the
335

Id. at 370.
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(4), which codified the definition of “beneficial use”
as meaning:
the use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the
purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made. Without limiting
the generality of the previous sentence, “beneficial use” includes: (a)
The impoundment of water for firefighting or storage for any purpose
for which an appropriation is lawfully made, including recreational,
fishery, or wildlife purposes; (b) [t]he diversion of water by a county,
municipality, city and county, water district, water and sanitation district,
water conservation district, or water conservancy district for recreational
in-channel diversion purposes; and (c) [f]or the benefit and enjoyment
of present and future generations, the appropriation by the state of
Colorado in the manner prescribed by law of such minimum flows between
specific points or levels for and on natural streams and lakes as are
required to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.
See also Cal. Const. art. X, § 2, which states:
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this
State the general welfare requires that the water resources of the State
be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable,
and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use
of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be
exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in
the interest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water
or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water
course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be
reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right
does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or
method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.
337
Daniels, supra note 329, at 555; see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-101.
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Enku Tensay Woldemaryam, Making the Nile River a Point of Cooperation Between
Ethiopia and Egypt: Building Confidence Through Water Diplomacy, 3 BUDAPEST INT’L
RSCH. CRITICS INST. J. 2494, 2495 (2020).
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Mutahi, supra note 56.
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no injury rule,341 Egypt’s usage of the Nile River as the end downstream
country cannot technically harm other downstream nations. In the last few
decades, other African nations such as Sudan and Ethiopia began assuming control over their share of the Nile River.342 Accordingly, what matters the most is how an upstream riparian country manages its water
share, not what a downstream country does with its share.343 Assuming
that Ethiopia is right, that Egypt builds dams and wastes water resources,
this does not give Ethiopia the right to do the same to its Nile River share
for two apparent reasons. First, Ethiopia does not have a prior appropriation right to the Nile River.344 Second, Ethiopia—an upstream nation
controlling the source of the Nile River—should carefully use its water
share so as not to injure the rest of the Nile basin riparian countries.345
Nonetheless, this doctrine does not withstand scrutiny since cooperative management of international water resources has become the norm
among riparian countries since the last century.346 Further, it contradicts
other international law doctrines such as sovereignty and non-interference
in domestic affairs, which gives the right of a nation to use its domestic
resources however it pleases347—under certain guidelines and limitations
discussed below.
B.

Priority of Water Use

The prior appropriation doctrine evolved into the priority of shared
water usage from the most to the least vital.348 While the 1997 UNWC
constitutes the main body of international water law that governs water
usage, it does not explicitly rank or prioritize any water usage over
another.349 Nonetheless, the language of Article 10(2) of the Convention
emphasizes a special regard to vital human needs in resolving water
conflicts.350 On the other hand, the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters
341

ED WHITELAW, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE POINT OF DIVERSION AND THE NO
INJURY RULE, ECONorthwest 3 (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water
rights/water_issues/programs/bay_delta/california_waterfix/exhibits/docs/CSPA%20et
%20al/cwin_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQ9Y-8RGY].
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Woldemaryam, supra note 338, at 2495.
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Id. at 2496.
346
Id.
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Woldemaryam, supra note 338, at 2495–97.
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UNWC, supra note 158, art. 5, ¶ 1.
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of International Rivers 1966 (“Helsinki Rules”)—the second most important international water law agreement—expressly deny any priority of
water usage over another in Article IV.351 Nonetheless, one scholar tracked
and reviewed the eight water disputes where the UNSC became involved.352 His analysis revealed that the priority to the UNSC in international water disputes is drinking water over other uses of water even
when water treaties do not prioritize specific uses of water.353 It appears
that the UNSC intervened and prioritized certain water usages for
humanitarian purposes in six different situations.354
Accordingly, if the Egypt-Ethiopia Nile River dispute posed a serious
threat to international world peace, the UNSC would be expected to intervene and prioritize the most vital humanitarian usage of the Nile River
water.355 While Ethiopia’s GERD reservoir is used for generating electricity,356 Egypt uses most of the Nile River water for drinking and agriculture.357 Thus, it is very likely that the UNSC intervention will decide for
the priority of water use by Egypt due to its vital humanitarian needs.
However, that does not translate into deconstructing the GERD dam or
emptying the reservoir, but rather managing both in a way that guarantees enough flow of the Nile River water with an acceptable quality.
C.

Equitable and Reasonable Use Standard

The equitable standard, often referred to as the “equitable and
reasonable use” standard, entitles basin states to have access to an equitable and reasonable share of the water resources, and amounts of water
are allocated according to equity.358 The UNWC defines equitable use of
water resources to include “attaining optimal and sustainable utilization
thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the
watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the

international watercourse, it shall be resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7, with
special regard being given to the requirements of vital human needs.”
351
Art. VI of the Helsinki Rules states: “A use or category of uses is not entitled to any
inherent preference over any other use or category of uses.” United Nations, Helsinki
Rules, art. 6, 1966.
352
Fry & Chong, supra note 12, at 365.
353
Id.
354
Id. at 368–69.
355
Id. at 364.
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Woldemaryam, supra note 338, at 2495.
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Id. at 2496.
358
See Meshel, supra note 109, at 139–40.
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watercourse.”359 Further, the UNWC embraced the principle that states
consider the development and protection over shared water resources as
part of their equitable and reasonable use, which would also “include[]
both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the
protection and development thereof . . . .”360
In the United States, for more than a century, the Supreme Court
has determined issues of equitable apportionment.361 Equitable apportionment is federal common law governing the Supreme Court’s determinations over which states get what water rights of water resources
between states.362 It is a doctrine based on equity, the particularities of
the case, and a balancing of states’ interests.363 Based on the Compact
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to hear these types of cases between states and inherent authority
to equitably apportion interstate water resources between states.364 The
doctrine of equitable apportionment is the legal standard used by courts
when they are going beyond the interpretation of an interstate river
compact to determine questions of water allocation.365
D.

Appreciable Harm Standard vs. Significant Harm Standard

Another principle for interstate water resource governance is the
concept of “appreciable harm.”366 Article VII of the UNWC includes this
principle of appreciable harm, whereby states have an obligation when
using international water resources not to cause significant harm to other
watercourse states;367 however, if harm is caused, then states must take
359

UNWC, supra note 158, art. 5.
Id.
361
See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
362
See id. at 113–14 (determining that a court should consider the particular circumstances and the rules of equity and balance each states’ interests when allocating water
resources rights between states).
363
See Fahmy, supra note 328, at 857–58.
364
Florida v. Georgia, 141 S. Ct. 1175, 1180 (2021).
365
“Where, as here, the Court is asked to resolve an interstate water dispute raising questions beyond the interpretation of specific language of an interstate compact, the doctrine
of equitable apportionment governs our inquiry.” Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502,
2513 (2018).
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Memorandum from James A. Hanlon on Implementation of Clean Water Act Section
316(a) Thermal Variances in NPDES Permits (Review of Existing Requirements) to the
Water Division Directors, Regions 1–10 (Oct. 28, 2008), https://www3.epa.gov/region1
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all appropriate measures to eliminate or mitigate such harm and even pay
damages.368 This legal standard was first used in transboundary pollution cases, such as in the Trail Smelter Arbitration,369 to distinguish
between occasional damage by pollution and damage that would significantly alter the quality or appearance of the environment.370 Scholars
have defined appreciable harm “as harm that is significant—i.e., not
trivial or inconsequential—but is less than ‘substantial.’”371 “The term
‘harm’ is used in its factual sense. There must be an actual impairment
of use, injury to health or property, or a detrimental effect on the ecology
of the watercourse.”372
On the other hand, the do no “significant harm” principle means
that states should not use their territory in such a manner to cause
significant harm to another state.373 This principle was the main guiding
policy for international basin management, but now it is seen as equal
to or slightly lower in priority than equitable use.374 In particular, the
recent report by the International Law Commission (“ILC”) recognizes that
this principle is key in places that share transboundary water resources,
including rivers, aquifers, and other inland bodies of water.375 Further,
the UNWC defines “significant harm” as the requirement that States “in
utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other
368

Watercourse states shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in
their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing
of significant harm to other watercourse states. Where significant harm
nevertheless is caused to another watercourse state, the states whose
use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use,
take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of
Article 5 and Article 6, in consultation with the affected state, to
eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the
question of compensation.
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See generally Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1941).
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See generally id.; see also Gabriel Eckstein, Application of International Water Law to
Transboundary Groundwater Resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute over GabcikovoNagymaros, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 67, 77 (1995).
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watercourse States.”376 The ILC defines a “significant” level of harm as
“something more than ‘detectable’ but need not be at the level of ‘serious’
or ‘substantial’” and “[s]uch harm must lead to real detrimental effects
on the environment.”377 The significant harm standard can also include
negative impacts to the enjoyment of human rights, such as the right to
water, right to life, or right to food.378
E.

A Holistic Approach Standard Developed in the Footprints
of the U.S. Supreme Court Resolution of the Interstate
Water Disputes

Regarding interstate water disputes in the United States, the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over these types of cases based
on constitutional law and by statute.379 Many of the cases discussed below
involved a “River Master” or a “Special Master” to handle the disputes.380
The Court looks to the text of the compacts to help determine legal outcomes, especially on water apportionment issues.381 We will briefly discuss
two of the most recent U.S. Supreme Court cases resolving interstate water
disputes before emphasizing the holistic criteria often adopted by the
Court to determine the equitable apportionment of interstate water shares.
1.

Texas v. New Mexico, 141 S. Ct. 509 (2020)

The 1949 Pecos River Compact (“the Compact”) provides an equitable apportionment of water resources between Texas and New Mexico,
where a River Master annually calculates New Mexico’s water allocation
to Texas.382 Due to the flow of the Pecos River, the Compact does not
specify how much water must be allocated but rather requires that the
river not be depleted.383 In this case, a dispute arose between Texas and
New Mexico over water resources that were lost due to evaporation.384 A
376

See UNWC, supra note 158, art. 7.
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378
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See, e.g., Florida v. Georgia, 141 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2021).
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Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 386–89 (2011).
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See Pecos River Compact, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-19 (West 1949) (see Article I
specifically).
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tropical storm hit the Pecos River Basin in 2014 causing heavy rainfall.385
The Texas River Commissioner for the Compact requested that some of
the Pecos River water be stored in New Mexico, and New Mexico agreed.386
However, approximately 21,000 acres of water evaporated before New
Mexico released the water to Texas in 2015.387 The issue before the Court
was whether New Mexico should receive delivery credit for the water it
accepted from Texas, even though the water evaporated.388
The Court analyzed the text of the Compact as well as the River
Master’s Manual to determine whether New Mexico would receive delivery credit.389 Article III(a) of the Compact establishes the delivery
obligation that “. . . New Mexico shall not deplete . . . the flow of the
Pecos River at the New Mexico-Texas state line below an amount which
will give to Texas a quantity of water [measured by the 1947 level] . . . .”390
Under Article VI(c), the Compact contains the “inflow-outflow method”
as the calculation used to determine New Mexico’s 1947 interstate Pecos
River allocation of water.391 Additionally, the Court looked to the River
Master’s Manual, which was added to the Compact in a 1988 amendment.392 Referencing the River Master’s Manual Section C.5 regarding
storage, the Court determined that the language was clear that since
Texas requested their water to be stored in New Mexico, New Mexico
would receive delivery credit.393 Even though some of the water evaporated, Texas bore the responsibility for any loss of water because New
Mexico would have released the water downstream had Texas not requested them to hold it.394 On December 14, 2020, the Court held that New
Mexico received credit for the water resources because, but for Texas’s

385

Id. at 511, 513.
Id.
387
Id. at 513.
388
There was a timeliness issue as well regarding the filings, but for purposes of this
Article it will not be discussed.
389
Texas, 141 S. Ct. at 511–12.
390
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-19 (1949).
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Texas, 141 S. Ct. at 512 (referring to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-19).
392
Id. at 515.
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reduced by the amount of reservoir losses attributable to its storage,
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channel losses is to be delivered by New Mexico at the New MexicoTexas state line.
Id. at 513.
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request, New Mexico would have delivered their water allocation to
Texas.395 Thus, New Mexico received the delivery credit, even though the
water resources evaporated.396 Had Texas not requested New Mexico to
store the water, then the result would likely have been different.
2.

Florida v. Georgia, 141 S. Ct. 1175 (2021)

This case involves another dispute between Florida and Georgia
over the proper apportionment of water resources in the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint River Watershed Basin (“ACF Basin”).397 The watershed is comprised of the three rivers (Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, and
Flint) as well as three states (Florida, Georgia, and Alabama).398 The
Chattahoochee River originates in northern Georgia, flows south past
Atlanta, meanders on a southern route along the Alabama border, before
it enters Florida in Lake Seminole, where it meets the Flint River, thereby
becoming the Apalachicola River.399 Then it flows into northwest Florida
before it enters the Apalachicola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico.400 The water
resources from the watershed are drained by Georgia, Alabama, and
Florida by seventy-four percent, fifteen percent, and eleven percent, respectively.401 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers operates a series of dams
along these rivers. They regulate the flow of water in the Apalachicola
River by storing and releasing water within the basin.402 The Master
Manual, the document that governs the allocation of water between these
states, was completed in 1958, and has not been updated significantly
since then.403 There is a compact for the ACF Basin, adopted by Congress
in 1997.404
Florida asserted that Georgia had caused irreparable injury and
harm to its oyster fisheries and to its river ecosystems when it overconsumed water resources in the ACF Basin.405
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The issues before the Court were: (1) whether Florida was entitled
to equitable apportionment of the waters of the ACF River Basin; and (2)
whether injunctive relief against Georgia for sustaining an adequate flow
of water into the Apalachicola region was appropriate.406 The long-standing
principle that states have “an equal right to make a reasonable use of the
Basin waters” guides equitable apportionment cases.407 As a riparian
state, Florida has an extra burden to show how the equitable apportionment of water would be a beneficial use.408 However, the Court did not
get to the merits of reapportionment of water to Florida and reasonable
or beneficial use.409
On April 1, 2021, a unanimous Court issued its decision in favor
of Georgia, because it found that Florida failed to meet its burden of persuasion for the Court to go against the findings of the Special Master.410
Florida failed to prove that Georgia’s overconsumption of its water resources caused the collapse of the oyster fisheries and harm to the river
wildlife and plant life; the evidence presented pointed to increased salinity
and predation that harmed the resources.411
Although Georgia won in this dispute, it could be argued that it
was a procedural win rather than a substantive one for not meeting its
high burden of proof.412
3.

The U.S. Supreme Court Applies the Equitable Apportionment
Standard Through a Holistic Approach Including Multiple
Factors

By tracking and analyzing multiple U.S. Supreme Court decisions,
we observed the multiple factors the U.S. Supreme Court considers in
determining the equitable apportionment of water share between states.
The first factor is allowing for greater efficiency of water usage.413
The “doctrine of appropriation in Wyoming and Montana allows appropriators to improve the efficiency of their irrigation systems, even to the
detriment of downstream appropriators.”414 In other words, the U.S.
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Supreme Court accepts the detriment of downstream riparian states, so
long as there is an efficient usage of water resources by the upstream
riparian state.415 If we hypothetically applied this factor alone on the Nile
River case, the GERD would constitute no water management issues—at
least in the hypothetical mind of the U.S. Supreme Court—since it constitutes an efficient use of the Nile River water to the detriment of Egypt
(the downstream riparian country).
A second factor the U.S. Supreme Court considers when applying
equitable apportionment is the public health, welfare, or commerce of the
riparian state’s population.416 This often takes place through one state
polluting water that is shared with another state.417 In this regard, the
U.S. Supreme Court opined that a state can file “another suit for injunction if the proposed sewer in operation shall prove sufficiently injurious
to the waters of the Bay to lead the State of New York to conclude that
the protection of the health, welfare or commerce of its people requires
another application to this court.”418 Unlike the first factor, the second
factor alone—if applied hypothetically to the Nile River case—would tip
the scale for Egypt. That is because both the GERD and reservoir technically lead to polluting Egypt’s share of the Nile River water.419 Assuming
that the ICJ or arbitrators have the authority to issue an injunction, by
arguing that the polluted share of the Nile River water will injure its
people’s health, welfare, or commerce, Egypt would qualify for obtaining
an injunction against Ethiopia.
The third factor is a cost-benefit analysis that considers the particular circumstances of each case and the rules of equity. In Kansas v.
Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that:
[W]hile from the testimony it is apparent that the diversion of the waters of the Arkansas River by Colorado for
purposes of irrigation does diminish the volume of water
flowing into Kansas, yet it does not destroy the entire flow.
The benefit to Colorado in the reclamation of arid lands
has been great, and ought not lightly to be destroyed. The
detriment to Kansas by the diminution of the flow of the
415

Id. at 371, 381.
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 298, 301–02 (1921).
417
Id. at 298.
418
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419
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1, 3–4 (2021).
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water, while substantial, is not so great as to make the
appropriation of the part of the water by Colorado an
inequitable apportionment between the two States.420
Here, the third factor significantly tips the scale for Ethiopia if applied
to the Nile River dispute. By way of analogy to the Kansas v. Colorado
case, Ethiopia would argue—as it did at the UNSC meeting421—that the
diminution of the flow of water to Egypt, if substantial, is not so great as
to prevent it from operating the dam and reservoir at full capacity. Yet,
it could also be applied differently due to the peculiarities of Egypt’s
share of the Nile River and the technical reports that predicted droughts
in Egypt if the dam and reservoir operated at fill capacity.422 In other
words, the cost-benefit analysis of the Nile River water management
between Egypt and Ethiopia might be extremely complex and unpredictable. Nonetheless, applying the rules of equity ensures the most efficient
management of the Nile River water between the Nile Basin countries.
The fourth factor concerns the duty of each state to exploit its water
resources in a reasonable and calculated means to preserve water supply.
In Wyoming v. Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that:
Both [States] subscribe to the doctrine of appropriation,
and by that doctrine rights to water are measured by what
is reasonably required and applied. Both States recognize
that conservation within practicable limits is essential in
order that needless waste may be prevented and the largest feasible use may be secured. This comports with the
all-pervading spirit of the doctrine of appropriation and
takes appropriate heed of the natural necessities out of
which it arose. We think that doctrine lays on each of these
States a duty to exercise her right reasonably and in a
manner calculated to conserve the common supply.423
This factor, in addition to the third factor, may come close to the international “significant harm” standard.424 Applying the fourth factor to the
Nile River dispute reveals that Ethiopia had already breached its duty
420
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to manage its water share in a reasonable and calculated manner to
preserve the supply of the Nile River water to other river basin countries.
This becomes apparent by analyzing Ethiopia’s acts. First, it constructed
a huge dam rather than a mid-sized dam.425 Second, it constructed the dam
at a time when Egypt was distracted by the 2011 revolution.426 Third, it
breached the 2015 treaty concluded with Egypt and Sudan by not informing Egypt before filling the dam’s reservoir.427 Fourth, Ethiopia filled the
dam’s reservoir to its full capacity.428 Finally, it exerted bad faith and
selfishness in negotiations with Egypt, meetings at the UN General Assembly, and the UNSC.429 These acts do not conform with a proper,
reasonable, and “calculated” management of waters resources to “conserve”
the common supply of water to other countries. Egypt’s interests tip the
scale under this factor.
Yet hypothetically applying each factor or standard alone on the
Nile River case does not reap the best results since it often disregards other
important considerations that may influence assigning equitable apportionment. Thus, and most notably, the Court explicitly emphasized its holistic approach in applying equitable apportionment when it opined that:
Equitable apportionment is the doctrine of federal common law that governs disputes between States concerning
their rights to use the water of an interstate stream. It is
a flexible doctrine which calls for the exercise of an informed
judgment on a consideration of many factors to secure a
just and equitable allocation. We have stressed that in
arriving at the delicate adjustment of interests which must
be made, [] we must consider all relevant factors, including: physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use
of water in the several sections of the river, the character
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses,
the availability of storage water, the practical effect of
wasteful uses on downstream areas, and the damage to
upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream
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areas if a limitation is imposed on the former. Our aim is
always to secure a just and equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas.430
Accordingly, adopting a holistic approach to apply the equitable
apportionment standard proves to be the most reliable substantive standard of all. This is because a court or an arbitral tribunal using a holistic
approach may consider all relevant circumstances, such as prior appropriation, priority of water use, environmental issues, consumption, pollution, downstream flow, and damages to upstream users versus benefits
for downstream users—these factors are not exhaustive. As the U.S.
Supreme Court opined:
Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and climatic
conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows,
the extent of established uses, the availability of storage
water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream
areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the
benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on
the former—these are all relevant factors. They are merely
an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate
the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.431
CONCLUSION
Applying a holistic approach in the footsteps of the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions is more beneficial than applying a single factor, standard, or criteria to decide on water management issues. To adequately
analyze and resolve the Nile River dispute, we reviewed the competing
interests among the three disputant nations: Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia.432
Assessing the harmful impact of the GERD on Egypt and Sudan reveals
that, although Sudan may face some adverse consequences, the most

430

Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (internal quotations, citations, and
brackets omitted).
431
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
432
See discussion supra Section I.A.

472

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:421

significant harms will be on the Egyptian side, as it is the last downstream
nation and is wholly dependent on the Nile River.433 According to all available technical resources, Egypt’s share of the Nile River will decrease
substantially.434 Further, the limited water share that will reach Egypt
will be rather polluted.435 Since Egypt has a steep population growth,
scarcity of drinking water is also expected.436 Moreover, the agriculture
output of Egypt will significantly decrease.437 On the other hand, Ethiopia’s main interests revolve around generating hydroelectric power to
satisfy the energy needs of its population.438 Further, Ethiopia claims
that the hydroelectric power generated can be used to feed electricity
needs in the whole region.439 In addition, the GERD and its reservoir will
be used in agricultural and industrial development.440
According to game theory, first developed by John Nash,441 a sequence of games involving the same players who cannot foresee or predict
the end is likely to induce cooperation even without external intervention.442 Eyal Benvenisti argues that since game theory is likely to produce
cooperation among riparian states, enhancing interaction among the
actors becomes the priority.443 One way Egypt and Ethiopia could achieve
more harmonized interactions is to initiate talks between the Coptic church
of Egypt and the Ethiopian church. The historical connection between
the two churches may indeed enhance interaction between the two nations on the larger political scale.444 The connection between the Coptic
church of Egypt and the Ethiopian church goes back to the fifth century.445
In fact, the Coptic church of Egypt maintained control over the Ethiopian
church until its recent independence in 1959.446 The relationship between
433
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the two churches remains strong regardless of the politics between the
two countries.447 If the Coptic church of Egypt could initiate talks with
the Ethiopian church to induce more cooperation and lower the feelings
of animosity between the two nations, the Nile River negotiation or
mediation may succeed.
In contrast, under game theory, distrust relating to the expectations
of one player’s performance may deconstruct any hope for cooperation.448
It is also undisputable that water disputes are a matter of sensitive foreign
policy.449 Moreover, as we mentioned before, unresolved water disputes
often lead to military action initiated by the most harmed nation.450
Negotiations between Ethiopia and Egypt have not been successful for
the last decade and neither were any attempts to mediate the Nile River
dispute suggested by Sudan or Egypt.451 On the other hand, Ethiopia had
not shown a good faith commitment to reaching an agreement with other
Nile River Basin countries—especially Egypt.452 First, it took a unilateral
action in constructing the dam at a time when Egypt was distracted with
the 2011 revolution and its political consequences.453 Second, Ethiopia
continued the construction of the dam amid the ongoing negotiations
with Egypt.454 Third, Ethiopia unilaterally filled the dam’s huge reservoir
two times without consulting with Egypt or Sudan.455 In the latest UNSC
meeting, Ethiopia revealed strong national antagonism against Egypt,
claiming that it also constructs dams and canals, which affects the Nile
River basin, with no technical or scientific basis for this assertion.456
Finally, Ethiopia rejected any proposals of mediating the Nile River dispute
through the World Bank or the United States and decided to stick to the
unsuccessful AU negotiations.457
The next question that arises is dangerous to ask, yet necessary
for our analysis. If there are no cooperation efforts from the Ethiopian
side as shown above, should Egypt resort to military action to protect its
share of the Nile River? Our answer is in the negative for three prominent
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reasons. First, the management of shared water resources can never be
forced through military action, especially if the other disputant controls
the source of the river. Scholars almost unanimously agree that the best
method of resolving shared water resources is through adopting an international agreement as a result of successful negotiation or mediation.458
Thus, peaceful means are the only available means to sustain a resolution to an existing water dispute. Second, although Egypt has the upper
hand in military power, it would lose its favorable political position in the
African region if it engaged in a military action against the GERD.459
Further, Egypt would lose its favorable political position to the United
States, EU, and Russia if it used force against Ethiopia.460 Accordingly,
there is no benefit in using military power in a situation where a country
would lose its political influence in the region and the world. Finally, if
Egypt decided to engage in a military action against Ethiopia, it would
lose its international financial standing.461 Since Egypt’s economic needs
are still satisfied by World Bank loans and U.S. subsidized exports, it becomes unwise to engage in a military action that would come with adverse financial consequences.462 These financial consequences may include
a higher interest rate on its World Bank loans, less subsidized exports from
the United States, and a blow to its foreign direct investment regime.463
If Egypt can no longer negotiate or mediate successfully with
Ethiopia—whether through the government or the Coptic Church—due
to the latter’s reluctance to engage in resolving the Nile River dispute,
and Egypt cannot engage in the use of force for the above-stated reasons,
what can Egypt do to resolve the Nile River dispute? As we suggested in
Part II, Egypt may resort to conciliation, arbitration (after adopting an
arbitration agreement), or refer the case to the ICJ.464 Moreover, the
UNSC may intervene under Chapter VI of the UN Charter to recommend
binding means of settlement.465
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Finally, we recommend that—if the case has reached a court or
a tribunal—the ICJ, conciliators, or arbitrators apply a holistic approach
that encompasses multiple standards including the significant harm,
prior appropriation, priority of water use, and equitable apportionment
standards. As discussed above, the holistic standard allowed the U.S.
Supreme Court to successfully resolve many complex interstate water
disputes.466 Furthermore, although some scholars have pointed to the
prevalence of the significant harm standard over the equitable apportionment standard, they do not deny that taking both into account reaps the
same positive results.467 Similarly, applying a holistic standard may prove
successful in resolving the Nile River dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia,
whether through international arbitration, conciliation, or the ICJ.

fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to
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